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The Red Army man needed fewer supplies; Russian weapons were less complex and needed less attention; civilians performed duties in rear areas, in hospitals, on the railroads, and as veterinarians, 2. The smaller wagons were easier on the horses; tractors pulled heavy loads instead of large teams of draft horses, 3. The German division had more men to supply and more heavy weapons; 4. German service units had to protect themselves against partisans and required more men to do so, 5. The German philosophy was that a division supplied itself directly from the army depots using its own men to bring forward the munitions, fuel, rations, and fodder.
168. 48. Harrison, p. 133. 49. Harrison, pp. 122-23. 50. Harrison, p. 101. 51. Harrison, p. 98. 52. Harrison, p. 93. 53. Harrison, pp. 93, 135. 54. Harrison, p. 137. 55. Harrison, p. 135. 56. Harrison, pp. 208-08. 57. Harrison, p. 81; Nove, pp. 87, 273. 58. Tiushkevich, Soviet Armed Forces, 266. htm[1/17/2011 5:27:41 PM] 59. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-45 (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 267. 60. Seaton, Russo-German War, p. 267. 61. Harrison, pp. 169-70, 172. 62. Tiushkevich, Soviet Armed Forces, pp 310, 341; IVOVSS (German), VII, 49; Harrison, pp.
8. Hinrichs, p. 282. 9. Hinrichs, p. 282. 10. Hinrichs, pp. 275, 282. 11. , Battle for Moscow: The 1942 Soviet General Staff Study (Washington, DC: PergamonBrassey's, 1989), p. 185-88. 12. Hinrichs, pp. 276, 283; Ely, p. 97. 13. Hinrichs, p. 280. 14. FHO, CGR, Report, no date, H 3/104, Roll 551, Frame 238; For comparable German and American data, see Walter S. , Second Front Now 1943 (University, AL: University of Alabama, 1980), pp. 164-185. 15. FHO, CGR, Kraefteberechnungen, H 3/118, October 1943, Roll 552, Frame 357.